### NSC BRIEFING

#### **NOFORN**

# Approved For Release 2000/05/50 CLTRDP80R01443R000200260002-1 CURRENT SITUATION FRENCH MOROCCO

- I. <u>Worsening Indo-China situation affects</u>
  North Africa:
  - A. Most serious in French Morocco.

    Nationalists will exert greater efforts obtain independence; French more determined than ever maintain hold.
- II. Anti-US sentiment increasing:
  - A. Growing tendency nationalists to link
    US to French colonial policy, but
  - B. Terrorist attacks, though shifted to French, not yet directed US airbases or Americans.

### III. Anti-French Terrorism:

- A. No let-up eight months despite vigorous French counter action.
  - Assassination, bombings, arson, railroad and communications sabotage.
  - 2. Average one attack daily.
- B. Recent shift attacks:
- 1. From pro-French Moroccans to French
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- 2. From urban to rural areas.
- C. French relying strong police action.
- D. Reinforced by new passive resistance movement:
  - Began April as show of nationalist strength, but has economic overtones.
  - Aimed French monopolies; bans on tobacco, bread; expected extend milk and sugar. Women required wear garb lesser yardage.
  - 3. Ban Moroccans use of modern machinery on penalty crops burned.
  - 4. Response immediate in Casablanca; spread Rabat, Tangier.

### IV. Basis anti-French resistance:

- A. Incompatibility nationalist desire independence with French determination maintain perhaps expand control.
- B. Erupted Aug 1953 with deposition of popular pro-nationalist sultan.

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- C. French "reforms", opposed by ex-sultan approved by successor.
  - 1. Strip sultanate remaining power.
  - 2. Extend French-control.

#### V. Prospects not good:

- A. French lost contact friendly elements.

  Formerly pro-French Moroccans are now critical of French policy.
- B. Positions hardened both sides. Mutual distrust. Nationalists sceptical any concessions by French.
- C. Nationalists probably not settle short public promise independence with definite timetable and immediate steps autonomy. Change of sultans alone not enough.
- D. French probably unable make real concessions: Prestige factors; strategic values, including source manpower.

  Strong opposition any concessions from small but influential local French community.